Based on a two-stage analysis of a panel of data on 12 outlets of a high-end retailer for 24 months, we investigate how the level of supervisory monitoring affects retail sales productivity. In the first stage, we use Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to compute the relative productivity of retail outlets in using their labor and capital resources to generate store sales. In the second stage, we regress the logarithm of DEA scores on contextual variables to obtain consistent estimators of the impact of contextual variables on productivity (Banker and Natarajan in Operation Research 56:48-58, 2008). Contrary to agency theoretic prediction that supervisory monitoring leads to an increase in retail sales productivity, our empirical results indicate that the higher the level of supervisory monitoring, the lower is the retail sales productivity for high-end retail outlets.
The impact of supervisory monitoring on high-end retail sales productivity Introduction
Improving productivity is an increasingly important objective of many retailers. To achieve this objective, many retailers employ supervisory monitoring to motivate and direct their salesforce. There has been little formal empirical evidence, however, on whether supervisory monitoring increases retail sales productivity. To explore this issue, we perform a two-stage analysis of the impact of supervisory monitoring on the productivity of 12 high-end retail outlets over 24 months. We first estimate the productivity of each outlet in each month using the nonparametric Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method. Next, we regress the productivity score on potential contextual factors that affect it to obtain consistent estimators of the impact of key performance drivers at our research site (Banker and Natarajan 2008) .
Agency theoretic research in marketing has examined the role of monitoring of salesperson's effort to alleviate moral hazard (Basu et al. 1985; Lal and Srinivasan 1993; Joseph and Thevaranjan 1998) Agency theory suggests that monitoring provides an imperfect signal on the salesperson's effort, and compensating the salesperson based on this signal induces higher effort. This imperfect monitoring signal can be interpreted similar to behavior-based control (e.g. Anderson and Oliver 1987, p. 77 ) which posits that supervisors who "have a well-defined idea of what they want salespeople to do" can work to ensure that the salesforce behaves accordingly.
Therefore, retailers are likely to employ the monitoring ability of supervisors to increase the productivity of retail selling activities. There has been little empirical evidence, however, to assess whether this agency theoretic prediction holds for high-end retail outlets in which customer-focused service involves greater worker empowerment and task ambiguity.
In contrast to agency theory, organizational control theory suggests that behavior-based control requiring high level of supervisory monitoring is not appropriate in an environment characterized by low task programmability (Anderson and Oliver 1987; Eisenhardt 1985 Eisenhardt , 1988 Ouchi 1979) . In high-end retail organizations, customer-focused service is likely to involve greater worker empowerment and lower task programmability. Supervisory monitoring is likely to constrain the salespeople from exploring creative new ways to provide higher levels of customer service. Therefore, increasing the level of supervisory monitoring is likely to undermine retail sales productivity.
We evaluate these two competing hypotheses using data on input, output, supervisory monitoring and other contextual variables collected from 12 retail outlets of a department store company for 24 months. Our research site is a company positioned at the high end of the department store industry. Its strategic positioning is to command premium prices for its merchandise by providing exceptionally high level of service to its customers, going beyond simply ringing up the cash register or responding to customers' requests.
We use Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to first assess the relative productivity of each retail outlet in each month in using its labor and capital resources to generate store sales.
We rely on the theoretical results of Banker and Natarajan (2008) for a formal justification of the use of the two-stage method in DEA. They show that the DEA estimator of productivity obtained from the usual analysis of input-output data can be regressed in the second stage on contextual factors believed to contribute to productivity differences. Specifically, they prove that the second-stage regression provides consistent estimators of the impact of the contextual factors on productivity. Their simulation results indicate that the two-stage DEA-based procedure performs substantially better than the one-stage parametric methods that rely on commonly used parametric functional forms such as translog and Cobb-Douglas to specify the production correspondence, which in turn outperform the two-stage parametric methods to evaluate the impact of contextual variables on productivity. 1 Using this two-stage approach, we find that contrary to agency theoretic prediction, supervisory monitoring leads to an increase in retail sales productivity. The higher the level of supervisory monitoring, the lower is the retail sales productivity for the high-end department store that emphasizes customer-focused service as a way to gain strategic competitive advantage.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses our research hypothesis. Section 3 describes the data and the estimation model employed for the empirical analysis. Section 4 contains the results of our analysis. Section 5 summarizes and concludes.
Hypothesis development
Competition in the retail industry has become very intense in recent years. To survive and continue to prosper in this competitive environment, increasing productivity is viewed as a necessity. Our research site is a retailer positioned at the high end of the spectrum for department stores. It offers service that is perceived by its customers to be superior and unique relative to service provided by its competitors. It has achieved differentiation through its innovative customer-focused service, resulting in the willingness of customers to pay premium prices (Porter 1996) . Customer-focused service involves understanding and satisfying individual needs, which differ widely across customers. Therefore, the tasks performed by its salespeople are more challenging, more difficult to prescribe and less programmable than the tasks required for a more conventional, mass-production-style service at a low-end department or discount store. The main role of supervisors at a low-end retail outlet is to have a well-defined idea of what the salespeople should do and to monitor them closely to ensure that they comply with the prescribed activities. At a high-end retail outlet, the role of the supervisors is much more ambiguous in supporting the salespeople.
Agency theory argues that if an agent's actions can be monitored more precisely, desired actions can be induced with lower risk premium costs, which in turn leads to an improvement in organizational productivity (Lambert 2001 ). There has been little empirical evidence, however, on whether this agency theoretic prediction holds for high-end retail outlets in which customerfocused service involves greater worker empowerment and task ambiguity. This is especially important since monitoring of ambiguous tasks may not provide more informative signals, and the simple interpretation of the theoretical analysis may not apply.
Organizational control theory suggests behavior-based control requiring a high level of supervisory monitoring is not appropriate in an environment characterized by low task programmability (Anderson and Oliver 1987; Eisenhardt 1985 Eisenhardt , 1988 Ouchi 1979) . Workers involved in customer service need to be empowered because the exact tasks required to improve customer satisfaction cannot be prespecified, as different customers have different needs, and their service expectations often differ from those of the management (Schlesinger and Heskett 1991) . Therefore, in high-end retail organizations, customer-focused service is likely to involve greater worker empowerment and task ambiguity, and increasing the level of supervisory monitoring is less likely to improve retail sales productivity.
The employee motivation literature has built on Vroom's (1964) expectancy theory and posits that workers will exert a level of effort in their jobs that they believe will lead to desired outcome. The theory suggests that employee perceptions are moderated by the degree to which she believes that the reward is possible (Pool 1997; Churchill et al. 1979 ). If at our research site salespeople are internally motivated to exert more effort in their jobs because of the intrinsic value of the work to them, and not because they are closely monitored by supervisors, excessive monitoring by supervisors may actually stifle creativity and innovation from the salespeople (Maslow 1954) . The literature on employee creativity also finds that most creative work occurs when work is complex and challenging, and supervision is supportive and noncontrolling (Oldham and Cummings 1996) . In a similar vein, Zhou (2003) demonstrates that when creative coworkers are present, the less supervisors engage in close monitoring, the more the employees exhibit creativity.
Therefore, we state our main research hypothesis formally as follows:
The impact of supervisory monitoring on retail sales productivity is negative.
Data description and estimation model

Data and variables
Each individual store-month in our sample represents a decision-making unit (DMU). We model the production function relating the output of each DMU as a function of its inputs such as labor and capital, and contextual variables including supervisory monitoring. Goodman (1985) and Thurik and Kooiman (1986) argue that sales should be the principal measure of output to identify ineffective use of inputs. Achabal et al. (1984) suggest that additional measures of ability to produce also need to be included as control variables. In our empirical setting, we measure output as monthly sales (SALES) in deflated dollars. 2 Since sales alone may not capture the strategies pursued by retail units, we consider multiple contextual variables (Venkatraman and Ramanujam 1986; Chakravarthy 1986; Lewin and Minton 1986) .
Past research has included store size, labor usage, and capital investment as inputs in the production function (Nooteboom 1983; Ingene 1982 Ingene , 1985 Hise et al. 1983; Good 1984; Lusch and Moon 1984; Doutt 1984; Ratchford and Brown 1985; Thurik and Kooiman 1986; Kamakura et al. 1996; Samiee 1990) . To capture the labor input in the production function, we utilize the number of selling hours in each store each month (HOURS). The two major forms of capital investments in the retail setting are the selling space utilized and the merchandise carried by the store. Accordingly, we include the size of the store in square feet (SIZE) and the dollar value of average inventory of merchandise (INVENTORY). INVENTORY is calculated as the mean of the opening and closing inventories carried by the store for a given month. To reflect input factors other than labor and capital, we include support activity expenses (SUPPORT) measured as other operating expenses exclusive of cost of goods sold, managerial and supervisory salaries, and wages for the sales personnel. 3 2 Banker et al. (2007) prove that DEA using the aggregate sales measure provides an aggregate measure of managerial and allocative efficiency in choosing the optimal mix of merchandise sold. 3 All variables measured in dollars are deflated by the Department Store Merchandise Price Index calculated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics to make them comparable over different months.
We also include several contextual variables. The retail manager does not control the area in which each store is located, the demographics of the store location in terms of median household income, median age, median family size, percentage of the population with college education, size of county population, and the intensity of the competition faced by each retail store. To capture the differences in the location of the stores, we include an indicator variable RURAL whose value is 1 if the store is located in a rural area, otherwise 0. To account for different demographics of the store locations, we include INCOME to represent median household income, AGE to reflect median age of county population, FAMSIZE to measure median family size, COLLEGE to reflect the percentage of the population with college education, POPUL to control for total population size in a specific geographical area. Stores in upscale and less heavily populated markets are likely to enjoy higher productivity as upscale customers value customer service and are attracted by enhanced customer service more than other customers (Peterson et al. 1989; Banker et al. 1996) . Specifically, retail sales productivity is likely to be higher for stores located in those regions where customers have higher household incomes, there is a higher proportion of older households with greater wealth, the family size is smaller, and the proportion of better-educated customers is higher. To capture the differences in the intensity of the competitive environment, we include the index COMPET constructed at our research site to measure the number and quality of competitors. Stores in a more competitive environment are likely to be less productive in generating retail sales. However, with greater competition, higher levels of quality may play a more critical role in attracting and retaining customers. Therefore, the impact of competition on retail sales productivity is an empirical question.
The contextual variable included to evaluate our principal hypothesis is supervisory monitoring (MONITOR) constructed as the ratio of the number of managers supervising the salespeople to the number of salespeople at each store. Furthermore, we include monthly sales index for other high-end department stores (SINDEX) obtained from the company to control for economy-wide and industry-wide effects and an indicator variable, SEASON, whose value is 1 during the holiday sales season spanning October, November, and December, and 0 otherwise, to control for the seasonal nature of the retail business. The relationship between inputs, output and contextual variables is depicted in Fig. 1 .
Insert Figure 1 Here
Basic model to evaluate the impact of contextual variables on productivity
Consider observations on stores for months. Each observation comprises one output , a vector of inputs , and a vector of contextual variables that may influence the overall retail selling productivity. The non-negative scalar , and vectors and are strictly positive in at least one dimension.
We specify the true production function and an error term . The production function is monotone increasing and concave in , and relates the input vector to the output as specific by the equation
The random variable representing the error is itself generated by the process where represents random noise for observation and has a two-sided distribution, represents technical inefficiency and has a one-sided distribution and the contextual variables are all non-negative. The error attributable to only noise and technical inefficiency is specified as .
Following Banker and Natarajan (2008) , we impose the following structure on the probability density functions generating the various variables:
Further, the probability density functions , , and are all independent of each other. Each stochastic variable has finite variance and the mean of the noise variable, , is zero.
This representation as in Banker and Natarajan (2008) specifies output as a general nonparametric function of inputs and an error term, and the error term as consisting of three distinct components: a linear function of contextual variables, a one-sided inefficiency term and a two-sided random noise term bounded above. Except for the additional component involving the contextual variables, this specification of the error term is analogous to composed error term formulations in parametric stochastic frontier models. Banker and Natarajan (2008) provide theoretical and simulation-based justification for the use of a two-stage method that uses DEA in the first stage and OLS regression in the second stage to evaluate the impact of contextual variables on productivity. To evaluate our main hypothesis about the impact of supervisory monitoring, we regress the logarithm of the productivity estimator (reciprocal of the estimated inefficiency ) on the contextual variables in the second stage, using the full panel of pooled data. Banker and Natarajan (2008) show that this two-stage procedure involving nonparametric estimation of productivity in the first stage followed by OLS regression provides statistically consistent estimators. Specifically the regression we estimate is represented as:
Estimation models
where the logarithm of productivity for store in month , the ratio of the number of managers to the number of salespeople in store , monthly sales index for other high-end department stores in month , 1 if month is October, November, or December, otherwise zero, median household income of the county in which store is located, median age of population in the county in which store is located, median family size for county in which store is located, the percentage of the population with college education for the county in which store is located, population size in the county in which store is located, 1 if store is located in a rural area, otherwise 0, the competition intensity of store 's market, are random errors, and . skewed to the right. The contextual variable representing our principal hypothesis is MONITOR, its mean is 24% and its median is 23%. Figure 2 shows the frequency curve for DEA productivity scores for our pooled sample of 288 observations computed using the BCC model in (4). The interquartile range for the productivity scores is from 0.53 to 0.75. The mean of the DEA productivity scores is 0.66 and the median is 0.65. Out of the 288 observations, 33 observations are on the production frontier. Table 2 presents Pearson and Spearman correlations between DEA productivity score and contextual variables used in estimation model (5). There is a statistically insignificant negative correlation between and MONITOR, before controlling for the impact of the contextual variables.
Empirical results
In the second stage of our empirical analysis, we regress the logarithm of DEA productivity scores on the contextual variables. Because pooled cross-sectional and times-series information is used to estimate the impact of contextual variables on retail sales productivity, there is the potential for serial correlation biasing the standard errors of the coefficients.
Therefore, we performed specification tests for residuals to check serial correlations and found that there exists substantial positive serial correlation (parameter estimate = 0.197, ).
We address this problem by using a variant of the Prais-Winsten (1954) estimator proposed by Park and Mitchell (1980) to make first-order autocorrelation adjustments to the variables. This estimator is consistent and performs especially well for short time series and trended data in relation to several other estimates (Doran and Griffiths 1983) . It also reduces the extent to which the serial correlation coefficient tends to be underestimated by simpler methods (Kmenta and Gilbert 1970) . We test our hypothesis using the parameter estimates from the regression using the transformed variables.
We present the empirical results in Table 3 . The coefficients on all the control variables except INCOME are statistically significant. The estimated coefficient on MONITOR is negative and significant (t = -3.64) at the 1% level. Thus, after controlling for economy-wide effects, the differences in the location of each store, the demographics of the store locations, and the intensity of the competitive environment, the results provide strong support for our main hypothesis that supervisory monitoring has a negative impact on retail sales productivity in highend stores.
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Conclusion
In this study, we investigated how the level of supervisory monitoring affects retail sales productivity using a panel of data for 12 outlets of a high-end retailer for 24 months. First, using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), we computed the relative productivity of retail outlets in using their labor, capital and other resources (represented by total selling hours, store size, average inventory, and support activities) in order to generate (deflated) store sales. We then regressed the logarithm of DEA productivity scores on contextual variables to consistently estimate the impact of the contextual factors on productivity and evaluate their statistical significance (Banker and Natarajan 2008) .
Contrary to conventional wisdom in agency theory that supervisory monitoring leads to an increase in retail sales productivity, our empirical results indicate that supervisory monitoring results in a negative impact on retail sales productivity for the high-end department store that emphasizes customer-focused service as a way to gain strategic competitive advantage. 
